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1

“Power is one thing. The problem of how to administer it is another.”
— Douglas MacArthur

O

n 9 April 2003, jubilant crowds and US troops toppled the statue of Saddam
Hussein in central Baghdad and drew down the curtain on the major combat
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Within hours of the liberation of Baghdad,
amid spreading disorder and growing expectations, debate began over the reconstruction challenges ahead. Criticism and frustration with the chaos on the
ground intensified over the apparent failure of the United States to plan adequately for the restoration of political and economic order once major combat operations had ended.
The root of Washington’s failure to anticipate the political disorder in
Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these challenges as “postwar” problems, a characterization used by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of
civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider the establishment of political and economic order as a part of war itself. The point is
not academic. It is central to any effective reconstruction strategy in future wars
and has profound implications for the military’s planning, command arrangements, and implementation of current and future governance operations.2
Military and political leaders need to distinguish between governance
operations, which are a core element of all wars, and activities such as peace operations and peacekeeping that may occur independently of war. Labeling political and economic reconstruction as a postwar problem muddles the fact that
central to strategic victory in all wars fought by the United States has been the
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creation of a favorable political order, a process overseen and administered by
US military forces—usually the Army. The United States entered virtually all of
its wars with the assumption that the government of the opposing regime would
change or that the political situation would shift to favor US interests. During the
Spanish-American War, we sought to change the governments of Cuba and
Puerto Rico, and succeeded. During the Civil War, Washington was determined
to change the way the South was governed. In Panama in 1989, the United States
ousted Manuel Noriega, and the war did not end until the regime against which
US forces had fought was out of power and political stability had resumed. In virtually all contingencies, political leaders in Washington conceded that only US
military forces were up to the task of overseeing and implementing this final aspect of war. Arguably, the 2003 war in Iraq is rooted in the most prominent recent
case where the political order did not change—the 1991 Gulf War. Some top Defense Department leaders have called the 2003 war a logical conclusion to the
1991 campaign.
President Bush’s early concerns, which emerged during his presidential
campaign, about the involvement of US military forces in nation-building and
peace operations stemmed from his desire to avoid overextending American resources and commitments.3 A clear distinction between governance operations
that are integral to war and the myriad of missions referred to in the peace operations discourse would be hugely beneficial. Such a distinction would allow US
defense planners to focus on the political and economic reconstruction that is a
part of war, while relegating humanitarian and nation-building missions to other
organizations. Moreover, equating the governance tasks that occur in all wars
with the broader missions associated with peace operations and humanitarian assistance reinforces the tendency to avoid planning for governance operations in
tandem with planning for combat operations. The essential point is this: Combat
operations and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in tandem. US soldiers in Iraq today are wondering why, if “the war is supposed to be
over, we are still being shot at.”4 They remain in Iraq because the war there is not
over. The war in Iraq will not be over until a legitimate government is in place and
until, as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has emphasized, the Iraqi
people no longer live in fear.
Furthermore, it often has not been specialized civil affairs personnel
who have conducted governance operations, but tactical combat personnel in the
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“Combat operations and governance operations
are both integral to war and occur in tandem.”

theater. Before World War II, in fact, specialized civil affairs units did not exist.
Even after the creation of these units, the reconstruction tasks in the theater were
almost always more than they could handle alone. Thus tactical troops worked
side-by-side with more specialized civil affairs officers to restructure corrupt police ministries, organize for local elections, and ensure that new government officials were, in fact, new. The civil affairs community that emerged after World
War II did not succeed in integrating these tasks into the Army’s conception of
war. The post-World War II reservists worked hard to convince the active Army
to recognize the value of civil affairs-related missions. However, by emphasizing the “specialness” of civil affairs tasks and making arguments about the distinct, specialized skills required for civil affairs missions, their approach actually
strengthened the prevailing view of governance operations as separate and distinct from conventional warfare. In making the case for their own specialties,
civil affairs advocates tended to ignore that in many previous wars, tactical combat forces performed reasonably well in implementing key aspects of political
and economic reconstruction. Furthermore, except for one active-duty brigade,
all of the Army’s civil affairs units ended up in the reserve component, reinforcing the separation from the active Army’s focus on combat operations and setting
governance operations apart from the professional heart of the military.
US Army officers have directly supervised the creation of new governments in many defeated states. They faced remarkably similar governance challenges in all of these contingencies. These include the well-known success
stories of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II, as well as cases that garner less attention, such as the Mexican War in the 1840s, reconstruction at the
close of the Civil War, and Puerto Rico and Cuba during the Spanish-American
War. Interventions that included governance operations took place during the
Cold War period, too: the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1986, and
Panama in 1989. Since the 1800s, in over 13 instances, Army personnel under the
theater commander’s operational control supervised and implemented political
and economic reconstruction.5 In virtually all of the Army’s major contingencies,
Army personnel remained on the ground overseeing the political transitions that
were essential to the consolidation of victory. Furthermore, the continued presence of Army troops in several cases—Germany and Japan following World War
II, South Korea after the Korean War—transformed the geostrategic landscape.
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Yet due to a host of reasons, most Army and civilian officials have failed to absorb the historical lesson that reconstruction is an integral part of war.

Governance Operations as “Strange and Abhorrent”
US civilian leaders always have been reluctant to give the military control over governance tasks, which are fundamentally political in nature. The military’s conduct of governance operations seemed to challenge the principle of
civilian control over the military, an ideal fundamental to the creation of a standing American army. America’s founding fathers were determined to subordinate
military to civil power and, as such, were careful to create the first standing army
in a manner that prevented the acquisition of too much power by one organized
group. Allowing the military to develop a capacity to govern could endanger civilian control of the military if these skills were, in turn, used at home.
Civilian discomfort with entrusting the Army with governance tasks
persisted through all of America’s wars. During the Reconstruction phase of the
Civil War, President Johnson expressed deep concern over the Army’s role in the
political rehabilitation of the South, fearing that such power was in “palpable
conflict” with the Constitution and a formula for “absolute despotism.”6 As the
Army began the reconstruction of Cuba during the Spanish-American War, President McKinley reassured the public that military government was being established for “non-military purposes.” In the early years of World War II, President
Roosevelt and many of his advisors believed that “military government was . . . a
repulsive notion, associated with imperialism, dollar diplomacy, and other aspects of our behavior we had abandoned” and was “both strange and somewhat
abhorrent.”7 After receiving one of his first briefings on occupation plans for Japan, President Truman remarked that civil government was “no job for soldiers”
and that the War Department should begin to plan to turn occupation responsibilities over to the State Department as soon as possible.8 Adding to concerns about
military despotism was the persistent ambivalence of Americans with the United
States’ role as “an empire” and the Army’s role as “guardians” of this empire,9
which governance functions essentially represent.
Civilian leaders supported the Army’s leadership over governance operations largely because of a lack of alternatives. Political leaders realized that
the Army was the only agency capable of accomplishing reconstruction in the
midst of and aftermath of combat. While some World War II leaders expressed
concern that civilians could “lose” the postwar world by default (by failing to offer a “comprehensive plan to rival that of the Army’s”), President Roosevelt recognized that only the Army would be able to deliver “prompt results.” Even the
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, acknowledged that the State Department did
not have the capacity to run an occupation. He compromised by arguing that the
State Department would have oversight over policy, with the War Department responsible for the execution of the occupation.10 During the Vietnam War, there
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was an acceptance by the Johnson Administration that civil agencies were not up
to the task of overseeing pacification; thus the Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was created within the US Military
Assistance Command.
Similar concerns about military control over governance seem to have
influenced decisions in Operation Iraqi Freedom, contributing to the decision to
avoid ceding full operational control of governance functions to US Central
Command (CENTCOM). The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), created before the start of hostilities in February 2003, was
charged with administering the country, providing humanitarian aid, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure. ORHA’s relationship to CENTCOM seemed
to create dual authorities, with ORHA technically under CENTCOM’s operational control, but with CENTCOM controlling critical resources (such as security), and ORHA itself charged with creating the conditions for Iraqi self-rule.
This early organization illustrated the ambivalence of civilian leaders about
ceding too much control to the military. Furthermore, the original appointment of
a retired Army general, Jay Garner, to head ORHA exemplified the sort of
uncertainty plaguing US leaders over who should control governance tasks. A
retired general officer offered the benefits of previous Army experience, but
without the perceived political ramifications of appointing an active-duty officer
to head such a political task.
These concerns seemed to only increase with the replacement of Garner
by a stronger civilian leader, L. Paul Bremer, to oversee the newly created Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). While the appointment of Bremer seemed to
reflect an effort to improve unity of command in the theater, with Bremer reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, the CPA remains dependent on CENTCOM for many of the resources needed by the CPA to accomplish its mission.
The specific sets of activities that fall under CENTCOM’s purview and the CPA’s
purview are being worked out in the theater, and although the situation seems to
be improving, there are still disconnects between the two organizations. One example: the CPA lacks the capability to secure areas, and without security, reconstruction in unstable pockets of the country cannot begin. Joint Task Force 7,
under CENTCOM’s command, retains responsibility for security, creating a bureaucratic separation between two inextricably linked tasks. The hundreds of
CPA administrators control very few resources on the ground. The CENTCOM
theater commander almost literally holds all the keys (Army convoys accompany
top officials), and CPA personnel remain dependent upon the Army for accomplishing many of their day-to-day activities. CENTCOM has a great deal of control on the ground, without the necessary authorities, while CPA has more control
on paper than it does in reality.11
These are precisely the kinds of problems and constraints that hampered civil agencies in past wars and led to the decision by US leaders to cede
control over governance to the Army. Indeed, with the appointment of Bremer,
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US civilian and military leaders failed to appreciate the key difference in Germany at the end of World War II between General Lucius Clay and High Commissioner John McCloy. It was General Clay, serving as theater commander
and military governor, who oversaw the toughest political and economic reconstruction tasks, including intensive denazification and demilitarization efforts
as well as banking and monetary reform. The civilian leader, John McCloy, arrived in 1949, well after stability had been achieved. In Iraq today, the Army—
with appropriate political direction—is the only organization that is capable of
asserting the countrywide reach necessary for effective reconstruction to take
root and evolve.

Reluctant Military Governors
The Army has never relished the tasks associated with governance.
Army leaders have had recurring concerns about the dilution of resources away
from Army combat missions. During the Mexican War, Secretary of War William
Marcy warned his commanding generals that tasks related to civil administration
would be the “least pleasant” part of their duties.12 During and after the Civil War,
the Army’s power during reconstruction made General Ulysses S. Grant uncomfortable, and Union generals were reluctant to divert any of their forces to meet
the requirements of the military governors: “Fighting generals believed that military objectives should come first: win the war and then worry about the political
ramifications later.”13 During World War II, General Eisenhower was reportedly
eager to hand duties over to civilian administrators as quickly as possible,14
though in fact this transfer did not occur until political and economic reconstruction was well under way.
Despite these kinds of reservations, the Army often has sought control
over governance operations due to military necessity and the desire to preserve
unity of command. Army commanders have recognized that operational control
over all activities in the theater was critical for maintaining stability and for protecting US forces during the course of the war. During World War II, competition
between the Army and civilian planning efforts emerged less because of the
Army’s desire to lead governance operations and more because of the Army’s determination to rise above the confusion of civilian planning and preserve unity of
command. Frustrating coordination problems had arisen in North Africa in the
summer of 1942, and General Eisenhower was determined to avoid a situation in
which conflicting civilian and military authority over the same territory existed.15
Furthermore, in practice, combat and reconstruction virtually always
occurred in tandem, with the defeat of the enemy forces in rear areas requiring a
consolidation of the political situation while remaining troops pushed ahead. In
Germany during World War II, US troops overtook towns in rear areas and began
to restore order and stability even as the advance into Germany continued. During the Korean War in 1950, the Army actively resisted efforts by the State De90
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partment and the United Nations to retain control over governance tasks, not
because the Army was eager to assume reconstruction tasks, but because the
commanding general insisted upon unity of command.16
The situation in Iraq today reinforces this link between combat and reconstruction—not as separate phases of the war, but as interrelated components.
Reconstruction efforts are under way, but American troops remain targets of almost daily attacks by Iraqi irregulars. Indeed, CENTCOM’s regular briefings
from Baghdad repeatedly refer to the intermixing of maneuver forces that are
continuing to clear potentially hostile pockets while conducting assessments and
aiding reconstruction efforts. Combat in Iraq, albeit at a different level of intensity, continues at this writing in late July 2003, and there will be no clear separation between combat and reconstruction until a new Iraqi governing body is
elected and reasonably stable.

Lessons for the Future
History offers some lessons for the contemporary situation in Iraq. First,
although the ongoing problems in Iraq reflect, to some degree, the inevitable “fog
of war,” most observers agree that planning for the reconstruction phase was not as
advanced as the planning undertaken by CENTCOM for the first three phases of
the war. CENTCOM had responsibility for planning four phases of Operation Iraqi
Freedom: setting the conditions for war, the air campaign, major combat operations (the ground offensive), and postwar stability operations. However, this temporal approach to war planning has permitted civilian and military planners to
allow CENTCOM to pay less attention to the final phase of the war.17 The organizational arrangements that emerged on the ground following the main combat operations reflected an eagerness to delegate perceived “postwar duties.”
An acceptance of political and economic reconstruction as an integral
part of war would facilitate decisions about appropriate command arrangements,
decisions that have been so difficult and incendiary in Iraq. History suggests that
leadership over reconstruction efforts should run through US military channels
and that the military should have direct responsibility for implementation. Unity of
command should prevail. This in turn suggests that the conventional wisdom of allowing greater civil control is wrong and that the tendency to bring in civilian and
international organizations too quickly should be carefully considered. Of course,
appropriate resources need to be given to the military to allow it to do the job.
Until the opposing regime is fully dismantled, the war is not over, and the
Army should remain in control of all governance activities. A formal acceptance of
this link between governance operations and war could offset some of the political
pressures faced by US leaders as they try to manage international pressure to be inclusive. Relying primarily on civilian international organizations for conducting
humanitarian relief activities, as the White House announced in May,18 could
prove to be disastrous for the accomplishment of final American war aims. ConAutumn 2003
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sider, for example, the current morass related to the failure of the international coalition to rebuild the “ring road” in Afghanistan.19 Policy can and should be made
by political leaders in Washington, but implementation falls squarely within the
US military’s mandate.
An acceptance of governance operations as a key component of war
also suggests that military planners will need to rethink those tasks that have
traditionally formed the core of the Army profession.20 Indeed, governance operations clash with traditional notions of the “military profession.” Samuel Huntington’s classic work on the subject, The Soldier and the State, argued that “the
management of violence” sets the military profession apart from others.21 This
view of the profession has shaped military planning and training. Governance
operations do not explicitly involve “the management of violence” and require
the military to engage in activities that are essentially civilian in nature, such as
rebuilding the civic infrastructure, restoring educational systems, and planning
for new elections. Similarities with civilian life set governance operations apart
from the military profession’s traditional view of itself.
Furthermore, Army doctrine emphasizes the defeat of an enemy’s combat forces—not the concomitant replacement of an opposing state’s political
leadership, which is virtually always required to consolidate victory. Despite the
considerable influence of Carl von Clausewitz on the Army, governance activities reside in the gray area of Clausewitz’s distinction between “preparations for
war” and “war proper.” Clausewitz does not directly address the operational
steps that military forces need to take to consolidate victory during and following
combat. Clausewitz focuses principally on the “why” of war, since wars are
fought for political reasons. Yet the “how” behind this linkage is equally important: governance operations are the operational link needed to consolidate a
state’s final political aims in war. One challenge today is to recruit and train soldiers in a manner that makes clear that governance missions are a key part of the
job they are signing up for. By explicitly accepting governance operations as a
part of war, military and civilian leaders can help to offset the kind of disillusionment being voiced by young US soldiers throughout Iraq as they wonder about
their ongoing purpose in the theater.22
A rethinking of the role of governance operations will require a reconsideration of accepted Army definitions and doctrines. Existing doctrine and the
concepts that shape Army combat service support, counterinsurgency operations, special operations, and civil affairs missions may need to be modified.
While many outsiders criticized the Army for the decision to close its Peacekeeping Institute at the US Army War College (a decision that has now been put on
hold), recreating it in its previous form should give the Army leadership pause. A
real step toward advancing strategic and operational thinking about governance
operations would be to revive the institute under another name, with a mission
that addresses the strategic challenge of integrating various elements of war,
from combat to governance, with an emphasis on the planning, organization, and
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training issues associated with military leadership over governance tasks in war.
Furthermore, consideration should be given to how governance operations
should be approached at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command and at
US Joint Forces Command.
Acceptance of governance operations as an integral part of war also
could offer US military and political leaders a stronger and more sensible rationale for limiting US military involvement in other kinds of operations. An acceptance of the reconstruction requirements that are inevitably a part of war would
provide political and military leaders with a basis for distinguishing between
those activities that are clearly a part of war and those that are not—thus providing a basis for rejecting US military involvement in the myriad of other missions,
not related to war. This is not to say such missions should be rejected out of hand.
Clearly, such decisions are for political leaders to make.
Finally, US military planners need to consider how combat operations
and governance operations should explicitly inform each other, since they are
part of the same campaign. As noted earlier, governance operations have always
occurred in tandem with combat operations. In Iraq, stabilization measures
were occurring in the defeated cities of Umm Qasr, Basr, and An Nasiriyah as
the Army’s 3d Infantry Division pressed on toward Baghdad. Just as joint operations are about achieving a synergy among the units of different services to accomplish the objective at hand, so should thinking shift about the relationship
between combat and governance. These different elements of war should be
viewed synergistically. Accepting this interrelationship will have specific ramifications for the combat phases of war and for how wars are planned, fought,
and ultimately won.
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